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## **Exploring the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Towards new forms of Partnership?**

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### **1. Background and general introduction**

In the context of the prospective 2004 enlargement, with 10 new Member States entering the Union, the need for a new framework for relations with neighbouring countries to the east and the south was felt.<sup>i</sup> The EU decided to construct a policy aimed at avoiding (new) dividing lines between the Union and its (new) neighbours: The European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).<sup>ii</sup> The main aim of the ENP is to, as former Commission President Romano Prodi stated, create a “ring of friends” surrounding the Union’s external borders. However, significant is that the ENP neither offers a prospect for accession nor an alternative to accession. Through the neighbourhood strategy the Union uses the bilaterally negotiated Action Plans, that are regularly monitored, to achieve a high(er) level of integration, stabilisation, democracy, rule of law and strengthened cooperation. In this sense ENP is the practical elaboration of the first ever common strategic vision of the Union, the in December 2003 adopted European Security Strategy (EES). The EES provides the EU with a general strategy for external action at the global and regional level and highlights the need to build security “in the neighbourhood.”

Aside from the present candidate members and the potential candidates in the Balkans, at this moment no further enlargement of the Union is envisioned. The reason behind the (temporary?) stop on further enlargement is not only the present *enlargement fatigue*, or lack of public support for further enlargement (especially in the ‘old’ 15 member states),<sup>iii</sup> but most of all the revival of the term “absorption capacity”. This term was first used in the conclusions of the Council meeting in which the Copenhagen Criteria were formulated: “The Union’s capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European integration, is an important consideration in the general interest of both the Union and the candidate countries”.<sup>iv</sup> A problem with the term “absorption capacity”, that appears frequently in the official texts of the Commission, is that there are varying interpretations of this term in the different member states. However, the present moratorium on further, future enlargement waves seems to suggest that there is an (almost) *communis opinio*n that the limit of “the momentum” has been reached, at least for this moment. This assumption forms part of the broader discussion about the “Borders of Europe”, whereby it is much easier to formulate what is Europe *not* then to answer the question whether the continent Europe can be, in the long term, identical to the economic-political project EU. Hereby an answer must be found to the current discussion on where Europe’s Eastern borders lie. In an attempt to answer this question, historical, geographical, political, economic, religious and cultural arguments are being used in the present discussion.<sup>v</sup>

\* In the version published at [www.europa-instituut.nl](http://www.europa-instituut.nl) the *Key issues for discussion during the seminar* are left out.

This “overview paper” accompanies the EU policy seminar *Exploring the scope of the European Neighbourhood Policy* on April 11<sup>th</sup> at the Netherlands Institute of International Relations *Clingendael*. In its structure it follows the programme of the seminar. The paper starts with the background of the ENP and its (present) challenges. Then it continues with discussion of the Southern and Eastern dimension of the ENP respectively. A key element of ENP is that it is not meant to prepare countries for membership. Still there is the issue whether in view of the *enlargement fatigue* and the fact that further enlargement to the East will take a long time to materialize, membership alternatives or “In-between-forms” of membership should be considered. The last part of this paper therefore focuses on such alternative options and whether they can offer a realistic alternative for membership.

## **2. ENP: challenges arising from its features**

### *Challenge 1: the (geographical) diversity*

A first challenge is that the name ENP is misleading, since it deals *not* with Europe’s neighbourhood, but rather with the Union’s.<sup>vi</sup> A second mistake in the name is that it is not only dealing with the neighbours, but also with the neighbours of the (present) neighbours, like in the case of the Southern Caucasus or Jordan. This is well reflected by the composition of the regional blocs to which ENP is applicable. Four regional groups can be identified as part of the “ring of friends”: the Eastern neighbours (Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine), the South Caucasus (by their own request, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia), the Mediterranean neighbours (Algeria, Libya, Morocco, Tunisia) and the Middle Eastern neighbours (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, Palastinian Authority). These regional groupings make it clear that the ENP does not deal with a homogeneous neighbourhood, but with different groups of neighbours, with also large differences existing within each group. This is, for example, reflected in the factor concerning economic development: GDP and the contribution of various sectors to GDP (see appendix 1), varying from 430 US\$ per capita (Moldova) up to 18.367 US\$ per capita (Israel). This huge differentiation, not only in the economic field, but also with regard to the rule of law, the level of democracy versus autocracy of states, the degree of relations with the West, and the size of the land (and the size of the population), was, from the start, one of the main points of criticism of the ENP. The question often posed was/is can one holistic European foreign policy for the direct neighbourhood be applied to such a great diversity of states (one-size-fits-all approach)? The only aspect that can be identified as being in common is the geographical setting of the four groups. The Caucasus and the Eastern neighbours can be grouped into the Eastern, or European dimension of ENP and the other two groups belong to the Southern dimension of ENP.

### *Challenge 2: (lack of political) conditionality*

The core business of the ENP are the bilateral action-plans, in which short and medium term priorities are set out. The content of the action plans differs from country to country (differentiation), in accordance with the country’s specific needs and capacities and its existing relations with the EU, and are mutually agreed upon (joint ownership).<sup>vii</sup> The essence of the offer of partnership through the mutually agreed Action Plans is to give the neighbour a sense of “virtual membership”, or of “sharing everything but the institutions”. Although the content of each individual Action Plan is tailor made, the structure of each Plan is similar. Every Action Plan contains chapters about: political dialogue and reform, economic and social cooperation and development, trade related issues, cooperation in justice and security issues, sectoral issues (e.g. transport, energy, environment) and the human dimension (e.g. education). The overall lifespan of an Action Plan is between 3 and 5 years and the policy is funded from the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI), which has replaced the previous MEDA and Tacis programmes. The budget of ENPI for the period 2007-2013 is almost 15 billion Euros, from which approximately 60% goes to the Southern neighbours and 40% to the Eastern neighbours.

An important challenge for the present form of ENP is that there are no legal sanctions for failure to implement commitments. This emphasises the point that the Union appears to have reversed the logic of conditionality: instead of offering a golden carrot from the start, the Union requires countries to undertake a variety of reforms. Only at the moment that these reforms have been implemented will the Union consider the possibility of some form of intensification of the relationship. It is hence unclear whether the new tools of ENP policy are sufficient to promote fundamental political and economic reform in the neighbouring countries, since they take the form of “conditionality-lite” only

Table 1: categorisation of partner states of the ENP <sup>viii</sup>

<b>With Action Plans</b>	<b>Without Action Plans</b>
Willing Partners	Reluctant Partners
<b>East</b> Moldova Georgia Ukraine Armenia	<b>East</b> Russia (not in ENP!)
<b>South</b> Morocco Tunisia Palestine Israel Jordan	<b>South</b> Algeria
Passive Partners	Excluded Partners
<b>East</b> Azerbaijan	<b>East</b> Belarus
<b>South</b> Lebanon Egypt	<b>South</b> Syria Libya *

- In this box ('Excluded partners without action plans') the original table mentioned "Excluded entities" as well, because they are non-recognised entities. In the East these include: Transnistria, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh and in the South the Western Sahara.

According to the authors who composed this model, the nine “willing partners with action plans” have different objectives to be “willing”, labelled “positive” and “negative”. The “positives” are the Eastern neighbours, who perceive ENP as a (first) stepping stone towards EU-membership. In this context a fifth sub-box could be added for the willing partners with action plans: willing to join the EU. This is obviously the case for Moldova and the Ukraine and even for a country like Georgia in the long term. Appendix 2 offers an overview of the present status of the bilateral action plans (see further: the Eastern dimension of the ENP). According to this model, the “negatives” want (much) closer relations with the EU, without the prospect of actual membership (see further: the Southern dimension of the ENP). Azerbaijan, Lebanon and Egypt are labelled “passive partners” since the conditionality of ENP from their perspective is literally too light. Azerbaijan is, as a result of its oil-reserves, economically and politically in a robust position, Egypt consider itself a leading player in the Mediterranean region and Lebanon is currently too much involved with its own internal security.

The “reluctant ones without action plans” are comparable to the previous group. Algeria is, like Azerbaijan, oil-rich and Russia, as a self-perceived world power, does not want to be stated in the company of the ENP countries. The reasons why the last group are identified as “excluded partners” is fairly obvious: the three countries are excluded on the basis of the lack of a democratic basis and/or political grounds (“pariah status”).

#### *Challenge 3: additional challenges*

Perhaps the holistic approach and (the lack of political) conditionality are currently the most visible challenges. However, this does not mean that there are not more challenges for the present ENP that can be summarized as follows:

- the self-exclusion of Russia leaves a large “hole” in the middle of the policy, although the “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement” with the four common spaces resembles ENP;
- No time span for meeting particular objectives is given (no clear benchmarks);
- ENP does not solve the basic dilemma of the EU, especially at its Eastern borders: inclusion/exclusion (or the “borders of Europe”);
- A main criticism of the ENP generally and the Action plans specifically, is that there are no legal sanctions for failure to implement commitments;
- ENP is still lacking the instruments to deal with both countries of concern (Belarus, Syria) and with conflicts in the neighbourhood (Israel and Palestinian authority, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia), while it is in fact a policy instrument of the European Security Strategy. The paradox in this case is that the Union has a strategy to stabilize the “neighbourhood” in theory, but is lacking an adequate instrumentarium in reality.

### **3. The Southern dimension of the ENP**

Late 2002, when the ‘Big Bang’ enlargement of 2004 was approved, the Scandinavian countries and the United Kingdom started advocating a European initiative for the Union’s new neighbours in the East. The Mediterranean member states of the EU, however, insisted that the Southern neighbours should be an integral part of this new policy. This resulted in the Commission’s “Wider Europe” communication of 2003. To avoid any expectations about future membership of the EU, this new policy was renamed ENP. The Southern dimension of ENP is relevant for 10 countries on the shores of the Mediterranean, from Morocco to Turkey, and to the Palestine authority. In contrast to the Eastern borders, there has been no discussion about the Southern border of “Europe” since 1987. In that year, Morocco applied for EU membership, but this application was rejected on the grounds that the Council did not consider Morocco to be a European country. Ever since then, the Southern borders – *in casu* the Mediterranean sea – of the Union have been set and the ambition of Morocco and some other Mediterranean partners, has become to get as close as possible a relationship with the EU, whilst aware that there is no membership perspective. In contrast with the Eastern neighbours, who almost all have a more or less comparable (Soviet) history, culture and religion, the Arab Mediterranean states have almost nothing in common, except that they are former European colonies. Some scholars argue that this serves as an additional reason for dealing with the two neighbouring regions.

There has been and still is great political interest in the Mediterranean area. The EU has committed itself, since the inception of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP), also known as the Barcelona Process, in 1995, to a holistic policy for the Mediterranean basin. This includes the setting up of a zone of shared peace, prosperity and stability with as a first, concrete goal the ambition to establish a free trade area with its neighbours, to be established by 2010. EMP is a policy based on shared values and enlightened self interest, whereby the main goals are basically identical to ENP: “by increasing our neighbours’ prosperity, stability and security, by projecting our prosperity, stability and security beyond our borders, we increase our own.”<sup>ix</sup>

In this context, the recent flow of illegal immigrants can be added. Instead of guarding the external borders of the Union by Frontex, however, the “enlightened self interest” would be better served by supporting economic development in the countries of origin of the immigrants. This would contribute to their being less incentive for illegal emigration for the citizens of these countries.

The most recent example of political interest was the initiative of the French President Sarkozy for a Mediterranean Union, which he first mentioned during his presidential campaign. Originally , Sarkozy envisioned this new Union as including only countries bordering the Mediterranean see, and these countries working together to form a political, economic and cultural Union. It has been argued that the original plan was mainly meant to keep present candidate countries of the EU outside the Union in the long term, by offering them an alternative.

Especially due to German pressure, whereby Chancellor Merkel stated that the original UMed risked fragmenting the EU and marginalising the EMP and ENP, the original initiative was watered down. As a result, the initiative for a political, economic and cultural Mediterranean Union was recently changed into an ‘Union pour la Méditerranée’ (UMed), which would be open to all EU-members. This has raised discussion of how this would fit with the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and the ENP. What is left of the original plan is that there will be two directors of UMed, one from the EU and one from outside the Union and a small secretariat, based either in Marseille or in Barcelona, which will prepare the bi-annual meetings of UMed. A first, one-day summit of all EU states and non-EU Mediterranean states is scheduled for 13 July.

In the context of UMed, the example of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC) is often mentioned as a model that might be workable for the Barcelona Process as well. Especially the concept of ‘flexible geometry’ is an essential principle. Progress in regional cooperation does not always necessitate the participation of all Black Sea states and/or vice versa. The same approach might be a workable method for UMed, where in addition to the Presidency and the Commission only the most concerned member states are present, on a case by case-basis, instead of all the member states participating. The latter might have made the Barcelona Process overloaded, too bureaucratic and technical, too top heavy and overly focused on procedures. Therefore UMed might be a channel through which the EU can cooperate with regional bodies and book tangible results through concrete projects, unlike the Barcelona Process, which has not delivered the desired results. The added value of UMed might be then that a small, permanent secretariat, will be placed upon the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership, serving as the motor for concrete projects. In a recent publication three of these concrete projects are identified:<sup>x</sup>

- promoting the rule of law, democracy and human rights, what is the “raison de’être” of ENP;
- intensified economic cooperation and economic development;
- addressing common security concerns, such as radicalism.

#### **4. The Eastern dimension of the ENP**

In article 49 of the Treaty it is stated that “any European democracy is eligible for membership” and thus can apply for membership. This condition did not create a problem for the enlargement waves up to the “Big Bang” of 2004. However, with the entrance of Cyprus, located before the coast of Syria, into the Union, for the first time a vivid discussion was started about the “European identity”. This is a discussion that by its nature is automatically connected with the question about the “borders of Europe”: what is (the continent) Europe exactly? This question could also provide an answer to the inclusion/exclusion question: which countries can, in the long term, join the Union and which cannot?

But the phrase “any European democracy” emphasizes precisely the central element of Ukraine’s criticism of ENP: the country belongs to Europe and not to its neighbourhood. The ENP, therefore, is perceived in Kiev as a fall-back option only for scheduled would-be EU members. Since the inception of the ENP there has therefore been an continuous discussion whether the “apples and pears in the same basket” – the Eastern and Southern dimension – should not be treated differently.

Against this background, the German Presidency of the Union in the first half of 2007, introduced the term ENP Plus, or ENP+. A central element in this new strategy was the idea that the EU should, with regard to its relations with its neighbours, make a clear distinction between the Eastern (including Rusia) and Sothern ENP partners. With the Eastern neighbours, especially Ukraine, Moldova and to some extent Belarus and the South Caucasian countries, firmer and more exclusive relationships should be formed. This would include the export of (a part of) the *acquis communautaire*, especially in the field of the internal market, transport, energy, justice and home affairs. The logic behind this German proposal was that the countries involved would get as close as possible to the EU in important and strategic policy areas. However, especially the Southern member states of the EU objected to this policy change, as Barbara Lippert (2007) states: “the geographical coherence of the ENP (...) reflects foremost internal interest constellations inside the EU, indicating that the Southern member states (France, Spain, Italy, Greece, Portugal and from 1 May 2004 onwards also Malta and Cyprus) have, from the very beginning (...) tried to prevent the ENP’s focus to be moved away from the Mediterranean towards the East, while the other member states favoured intensification of relations with the Eastern neighbourhood”.<sup>xi</sup> The Commission, however, also rejects in various documents the idea of ay differentiation in the holistic approach. It is, however, inevitable that differentiation will be on the agenda, since especially Ukraine and Moldova harbour hopes for membership. In this context, the perception of ENP, or ENP Plus, in the Ukraine, for example, is that it is nothing more or less then a stepping stone towards full EU-membership in the future, as recently reassured by Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko speaking at the conference “Ukraine-EU: towards common challenges” in Brussels on 10 March. It seems that an old idea of Prodi, who has suggested that “everything but the institutions (...) does not exclude the possibility of developing new structures with our neighbours at a later stage (...). I am thinking of innovative concepts such as institutions co-owned by partners”,<sup>xii</sup> can only function as part of a (temporarily) stepping stone towards full membership.

The paradox now is that the current member states of the EU perceive ENP as an alternative to (full) membership and that the European neighbours regard it the other way round: as a stepping stone towards full membership. It can not be denied, however, that one of the top priorities in the foreign policy of Ukraine and Moldova is (future) EU-membership. In terms of conditionality, it is of paramount importance that both countries should not be ‘locked out’. A workable solution might be the concept of “Most Favoured Neighbour (MFN) status” for the Eastern neighbours, especially Moldova and the Ukraine.<sup>xiii</sup> According to this concept, the EU treats these neighbours “normally” as a European state in the geographical sense and recognizes their legitimate right to apply for membership. If the countries concerned can meet the Copenhagen criteria, their applications should in principle be possible, although this will require a long-term strategy.

The ENP methodology is based on conditionality with as most important factor implementation of (part of) the Union’s *acquis*, the adoption of EU-rules and regulations. In this sense ENP is highly similar with the transformation processes of the mid-90’s, when the former Soviet republics were heading for EU-membership, and the present situation at the Balkan, with the adoption of the Stabilisation and Association Pact as a first step in the pre-accession process. A second paradox hence is that if the countries *in casu* have implemented their action plans successfully, they are better equipped for membership: “if the ENP works, it will create candidates”,<sup>xiv</sup> at least in Eastern Europe.

## **5. Alternative forms of membership**

Alternative forms of membership can be qualified as “In-between forms”. As noted previously, the “need” for these alternative forms was obviously felt after the Big Bang of 2004, since the enlargement process has lost “momentum”. But the “In-between forms” can not be regarded as *extra muros* options only, applicable to states outside the present Union. It can be regarded as an *inta muros* process as well, because internally the Union has become more differentiated as well, with all the “opt-out” clauses for some member states (“Europe à la carte-model”), the participation, or not, in respectively the Euro- and Schengen-zone, membership of NATO or not etc. On the basis of these developments, it can even be argued that the borders between membership and non-membership have become increasingly diffuse: differentiation between membership and non-membership is in this view a non-issue.

MEP Elmar Brok, former chair of the foreign affairs committee, was one of the first to start the discussion about alternative forms in the public domain. He introduced the term “privileged partnership” in the context of the Turkey-dossier: he specified this “third option” as follows: “With this (third option, RB) we could provide our neighbours with a European perspective without exposing ourselves to the pressure of a promise for accession that we cannot keep”,<sup>xv</sup> This idea was embraced, amongst others, by the French government. ENP can also be considered as a more ‘privileged’ form of cooperation, which would encompass more than existing arrangements but less than full membership. In the words of former EU-Commission President Romano Prodi: “more than partnership and less than membership”.<sup>xvi</sup> ENP is, in this context, one of the alternatives that excludes membership. Other in-between forms that are being discussed include EEC+, the expanded associated membership, gradual integration, junior membership and, in the Netherlands, partenariat. An overview of some forms of alternative forms of membership, and their political and institutional consequences, are included in appendix 3. Conceptually, all these “alternatives” are fairly similar to privileged partnership, but characteristics for this discussion is, however, that it is little concrete. All the concepts have more or less in common that they are based on the European Economic Area (EEA), of which Norway is the most prominent member. If the model of the EEA should be transferred to the Eastern dimension of ENP, then the customs-union should be applicable for the Eastern neighbours.

The key question is, however, whether the EU will be able by means of ENP or other alternatives like EEA, to realise reforms related to democracy, rule of law and welfare, in countries without a clear membership perspective, such as the Eastern partners in ENP. The conditionality towards these countries is notably less present and a more exclusive status or relationship, like the German ENP+, strengthens conditionality, but given the Ukraine’s ambitions, not sufficiently. Hence, the real problem is that the EU stands reluctantly vis-à-vis new members, while at least a part of the Eastern partners want membership. If the “in-between forms” are meant as an alternative for membership, then they will be counterproductive, since a privileged form of partnership in this context is only attractive if it does not drown the perspective of membership.

## Footnotes

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- <sup>i</sup> European Commission, *Communication on Wider Europe: A new framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbours*, COM (2003) 104 final, 11 March 2003
- <sup>ii</sup> European Commission, *European Neighbourhood Policy – Strategy Paper*, COM (2004) 373 final, 12 May 2004. The term “wider Europe” was replaced by ENP after the Rose revolution in Georgia to avoid expectations of full EU-membership.
- <sup>iii</sup> *Eurobarometer 67 Public Opinion in the European Union*, November 2007, p. 188-189. Further enlargement is supported by 43% of the population of the ‘old’ 15 member states. France, Austria and Luxembourg are amongst the lowest, with respectively 32%, 28% and 25% of their population in favour of further enlargement. In the new (12) member states, further enlargement is supported by 68% of the population.
- <sup>iv</sup> *European Council Meeting in Copenhagen*, 21-22 June 1993.
- <sup>v</sup> Rob Boudewijn, ‘Europa: wat is dat?’ (Europe: what is that?), in: *Jason Magazine*, August 2006, p.2-6
- <sup>vi</sup> Antonio Missiroli, ‘The ENP three years on: where from – and where next?’, *EPC Policy Brief* (March 2007). Italicization added by the authors.
- <sup>vii</sup> Emel G. Oktay, *Today’s neighbours, tomorrow’s partners: managing the neighbourhood in Post-enlargement Europe*, Clingendael European Papers no. 3 (December 2007) p. 16
- <sup>viii</sup> Michael Emerson, Gergana Noutcheva, Nicu Popescu, ‘European Neighbourhood Policy two years on: time indeed for a “ENP plus”’, *CEPS Policy Brief*, No. 126 (March 2007) p. 10
- <sup>ix</sup> Eneko Landaburu, ‘From neighbourhood to integration policy: are there concrete alternatives to enlargement?’, *CEPS Policy Brief* No. 95 (March 2006)
- <sup>x</sup> Michale Emerson, ‘Making sense of Sarkozy’s Union for the Mediterranean’, *CEPS Policy Brief* No. 155 (March 2008), p. 9
- <sup>xi</sup> Barbara Lippert, ‘The EU Neighbourhood Policy – Profile, Potential, Perspective’, *Intereconomics*, July/August 2007, p. 182
- <sup>xii</sup> R. Prodi, ‘A Wider Europe – A proximity \policy as the key to stability’, Speech at the Sixth ECSA-World Conference, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002
- <sup>xiii</sup> Oktay, *op.cit note 7* p. 34
- <sup>xiv</sup> Marisa Cremona and Christophe Hillion, ‘L’Union fait la force? Potential and limitations of the European Neighbourhood Policy as an integrated EU foreign and security policy’, in: *EUI Working Papers Law No. 2006/39*, p. 17
- <sup>xv</sup> E. Brok, *Why the EPP is pushing for a new, credible strategy for EU enlargement*, Brussels, 2006
- <sup>xvi</sup> Romano Prodi, *Europa and the Mediterranean: Time for action*, speech at the Université Catholique de Louvain-la-Neuve, 26 November 2002

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## **Appendix 1: GDP, GDP growth and the contribution of various sectors to GDP**

**Source:** Worldbank, *World Development Indicators and Governance Indicators* (2005)

	GDP per capita (in US \$)	GDP growth (average) in %	Inhabitants (millions)	Agrarian sector (share GDP)	Industry (share GDP)	Services (share GDP)
EU 15	22.445	3	384	2	26	72
EU 12 (new MS)	4.713	4	104	5	31	64
Netherlands	25.190	2	16	2	24	74
Belarus	1.868	7	10	10	41	49
Ukraine	960	3	47	11	34	55
Moldova	430	2	4	17	27	58
Georgia	971	7	4	17	24	56
Armenia	1.129	9	3	21	44	35
Azerbaijan	1.182	10	8	10	62	28
Syria	1.175	3	19	23	35	41
Lebanon	5.672	3	4	6	22	71
Israel	18.367	3	7			
Jordan	2.086	5	5	3	30	68
Egypt	1.624	5	74	15	36	49
Libya	7.517	4	6			
Tunisia	2.412	5	10	12	29	60
Algeria	2.121	4	33	8	61	30
Morocco	1.356	4	30	14	30	56
Year(s) of measurement	2005	1996-2005	2005	2005	2005	2005

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## **Appendix 2: Status of Bilateral Action Plans with ENP partners**

<b>ENP Partner</b>	<b>Action Plan</b>	<b>Adoption by the EU</b>	<b>Adoption by the ENP Partner</b>
Algeria	Under development		
Armenia	Autumn 2006	13.11.2006	14.11.2006
Azerbaijan	Autumn 2006	13.11.2006	14.11.2006
Belarus	(1)	(1)	(1)
Egypt	End 2006	5.3.2007	6.3.2007
Georgia	Autumn 2006	13.11.2006	14.11.2006
Israel	End 2004	21.2.2005	11.4.2005
Jordan	End 2004	21.2.2005	11.1.2005
Lebanon	Autumn 2006	17.10.2006	19.1.2007
Libya	(2)	(2)	(2)
Moldova	End 2004	21.2.2005	22.2.2005
Morocco	End 2004	21.2.2005	27.7.2005
Palestinian Authority	End 2004	21.2.2005	4.5.2005
Syria	(3)	(3)	(3)
Tunisia	End 2004	21.2.2005	4.7.2005
Ukraine	End 2004	21.2.2005	21.2.2005

- (1) The EU considers the Belarus authorities not yet to be sufficiently democratic. The PCA ratification procedure has been suspended since 1997.
- (2) Libya has not yet started to negotiate an Association Agreement as envisioned by the Barcelona Process.
- (3) A signature by the EU Council pending Syrian cooperation with the US Investigation Commission.

### Notes

Russia has opted to cooperate through the formation of EU Russia Common Spaces instead of the ENP.

Kazakhstan has expressed interest in the ENP.

### Appendix 3: Overview of the EU (alternative) Integration models

Level of Integration	Prospect of full Membership	Participation in The EU funds for Structurally weak regions and agriculture	Participation in the European monetary system and adoption of the Euro	Participation in the single Market	Possibility of expanding integration to other policy areas (e.g. foreign-security policy)	Right to vote in the Council
<b>Full Membership</b>	Not applicable	Given	Given with possibility to opt-out	Given	Given with possibility to opt-out	Given
<b>European Economic Area (EEA)</b>	Possible	Intended to a limited extent	Intended to a limited extent	Intended to a limited extent, no freedom of movement for labour	Primarily intended for trade policy fields	No voting right but the right to be consulted concerning the Enlarged EEA
<b>Gradual Integration</b>	Intended	Intended to a limited extent	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended for integrated areas (voting right by sector), no veto right
<b>Expanded associated Membership</b>	Not intended	Intended to a limited extent	Intended to a limited extent	Intended to a limited extent, no freedom of movement for labour	Primarily intended for trade policy fields	No voting right but the right to be consulted concerning the Enlarged EEA
<b>Junior Membership</b>	Intended	Intended to a limited extent	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended for integrated areas(voting right by sector), no veto right
<b>Privileged membership Partenariat ?</b>	Not intended	Not intended, participation in tenders for environmental, cultural and education programmes intended	Not intended	Intended to a limited extent. Counter proposal, expansion of the customs union to a free trade zone	Intended to a limited extent	No voting right but the right to be consulted concerning foreign and security policy
<b>ENP</b>	Not intended	Not intended, participation in EU programs in education and research areas	Not intended	Intended to a limited extent and with a degree of conditionality foreseen	Intended to a limited extent	No right to vote in the Council
<b>ENP Plus</b>	Not intended	Not intended, participation in other policy areas incrementally and with a degree of conditionality	Not intended	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	Intended incrementally and after conditioning	No voting right but the right to be consulted

Adapted and updated from: Cemal Karakas, 'Für eine abgestufte Integration. Zur Debatte um den EU-Beitritt der Türkei', in: *HSFK-Standpunkte* Nr. 4/2005, p. 14